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Abstract
This paper presents an implemented model of dialogue management for simple dialogues involving multiple speakers. In our
model, the user is one speaker, and the system ‘plays’ a number of other speakers. We present a number of principles governing dia-
logue management in such cases, which relate to turn-taking and the identification of the addressees of utterances. We also consider
how to extend a syntactic and semantic treatment of first- and second-person personal pronouns, and of addressee terms, in order
to deal with the multi-speaker scenario. We give some examples of our current system, and conclude by outlining some extensions
of the system to include disagreements, interruptions, and private communication between subgroups of dialogue participants.
© 2007 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
As enshrined in the Turing test, one of the core goals of Artificial Intelligence is to build a computer system
which can engage in a natural dialogue with a human. The difficulties involved in achieving this goal are by now
well known. One problem is the development of a wide-coverage grammar and lexicon, accompanied by an accurate
sentence parser. Parsers using wide-coverage grammars tend to return a large set of analyses for any given input
utterance, from which the correct analysis is hard to select. Another problem is the development of systems to support
reasoning; the best current theorem-provers have high computational complexity, so there is a tradeoff between the
size of a system’s knowledge base and the power of its reasoning techniques. Finally, there is the problem of dialogue
management. Even if a system can successfully parse the user’s utterances and has reliable reasoning techniques at its
disposal, there remains the question of what it should say next in response to the user’s previous utterance. This paper
focuses on the topic of dialogue management.
AI researchers often look for domains in which one or more of the above problems can be minimised, in the
hope that a practical system can be developed using current techniques. For instance, choosing a very specific type
of dialogue (such as a phone conversation to book air travel or to schedule a business meeting) helps to simplify the
dialogue manager and to limit the size of the knowledge base, while adopting a controlled language helps to reduce the
size of the grammar and lexicon. In our work, we are attempting to build a system which supports a wide and natural
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require sophisticated reasoning techniques. The domain we have chosen is computer-aided language learning (CALL).
(Specifically, we are building a dialogue-based system to help students learn the Ma¯ori language.) Language learners
typically have a much smaller grammar and vocabulary than native speakers, so it may be easier to process unrestricted
free text in a CALL application. Moreover, the semantic content in a language-learning dialogue is typically fairly
minimal; the ‘point’ of the dialogue is to practise the language rather than to achieve anything substantive in the world.
At the same time, the range of dialogue phenomena we expect to encounter in a CALL dialogue is essentially the same
as that we find in a native-speaker dialogue. The student’s knowledge of how questions and answers work, how to
signal acceptance of an assertion, and so on, can be transferred relatively intact to dialogues in the new language.
Thus even if a CALL dialogue system can make do with a restricted grammar and lexicon, and restricted reasoning
techniques, it must employ sophisticated dialogue management methods. Developing a dialogue system for CALL
can thus be seen as a task which exercises and extends our current models of dialogue management without being
impeded by the coverage problems associated with native-speaker dialogues.1
The topic of the current paper is how to build a dialogue system which can manage a conversation between multiple
participants. This is a topic which is particularly important in language-learning; if we want to provide a natural
environment in which the user can gain experience with the system of personal pronouns in a language, or with its
system of grammatical agreement, we need there to be multiple speakers. But of course understanding multi-speaker
dialogue is also an AI research topic in its own right; real-life dialogues often have multiple participants, and we need
to understand how such dialogues are conducted.
While there is an extremely large literature on multi-speaker dialogues, the number of automated systems which
support multiple participants is much smaller. Human–machine dialogue systems typically support dialogue between
two agents: the human user is one agent, and the system plays the part of another agent. In this scenario, the user
and the system take turns at being the speaker, and when one of them is the speaker, the other is the addressee (the
agent being spoken to). Automated dialogue systems can be configured in various ways to operate in a multi-speaker
scenario. Firstly, a system can simulate each dialogue participant as a separate autonomous agent (e.g. [29,34]).
Secondly, a system can play the part of a single agent in a context where there are several human speakers (e.g. [42]).
Finally, the system could support a dialogue between a single human user and several agents, all of which are played
by the system (e.g. [36,37]). In this case, the agents can either be genuinely autonomous, or they can act in the service
of a shared plan, delivering lines given to them by a central controller.
To extend a dialogue system to deal with multi-speaker interactions, whichever of the above scenarios is envis-
aged, two main things are needed. At the dialogue level, we need a theory of turn-taking, to decide when any given
participant is allowed to make an utterance, who a given participant should address when speaking, and who the ad-
dressees of other speakers’ utterances are. Secondly, at the level of sentence syntax and semantics, we need to pay
special attention to certain constructions: those which are used to refer to dialogue participants (in particular, personal
pronouns) and those which are used to control turn-taking (in particular, terms of address).
We have already built a two-speaker dialogue system, which incorporates full sentence parsing and generation using
a declarative grammar, and a range of standard dialogue management techniques (see e.g. [5,12]). The current paper
describes how we have extended this system to a multi-speaker environment, focusing on the additional syntactic
constructions and dialogue management principles which are required, and on the interactions between these. We
begin in Section 2 by describing the basic two-speaker dialogue system. In the remainder of the paper, we consider
two progressively more complex extensions of this system which support a multi-speaker scenario. The first of these
is presented in Sections 3–8. In these sections, we describe an implemented multi-speaker system, focusing on the
necessary extensions to the dialogue manager, and to our treatment of referring expressions and addressee terms. This
system makes some simplifying assumptions about consistency between participants in the conversation, namely that
participants never disagree on points of fact, and that no discrepancies are introduced into the versions of the common
ground which they all privately maintain. In Sections 9–11, we discuss how this system needs to be altered if these
constraints on consistency are relaxed. We conclude in Section 12.
1 Of course, language learners also make more errors than native speakers, so special facilities are needed for diagnosing and responding to
student errors. We will not discuss these topics in the current paper, though our system does in fact use such techniques (see e.g. Vlugter et al.,
[41]; van der Ham, [38]). In the present context, we simply note that having a sophisticated dialogue model which can predict what the content of
a student’s dialogue act should be is very helpful in detecting and responding to student errors.
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2.1. KR preliminaries
Our dialogue system uses several knowledge representation schemes commonly found in natural language systems.
The parser we use represents the semantics of a sentence in a language called Minimal Recursion Semantics (MRS;
[11]), which is designed to allow underspecification of the relative scope of quantifiers. For dialogue processing, we
convert an MRS expression into a message, which is a collection of Discourse Representation Structures (DRSs; [21]).
The nucleus DRS represents an utterance as a context-update operation, which takes the current dialogue context as
input and returns an updated context as output. The presupposition DRSs of an utterance represent constraints on the
input context which must be satisfied before the update can be made [39]. Each DRS comprises a set of referents
and a set of conditions. The referents of the nucleus DRS are the new individuals introduced by the utterance, and
the conditions are the new assertions made about these individuals. The presupposition DRSs introduce a set of
individuals whose properties must match properties of individuals in the current context. A set of bindings is also
given, which maps each referent of each presupposition DRS onto an individual in the context. Note that the context
is also represented as a DRS, with individuals and conditions.
As well as an update operation, an utterance needs to be represented as an action. We adopt a fairly standard scheme
here also: each utterance is associated with a dialogue act, a speaker and an addressee. An example of an utterance is
given in Fig. 1. A message consists of a single nucleus DRS and a set of presupposition DRSs. Each DRS is depicted
as a divided box, whose upper part contains a set of referents and whose lower part contains a set of propositional
conditions. Presupposition DRSs are drawn with dashed lines. The parentheses encompassing the presupposition DRS
are used to denote the set of presuppositions; in this case this set has just one member.
2.2. Dialogue structure preliminaries
Our model of dialogue structure is also quite standard. We distinguish between forward-looking and backward-
looking dialogue acts (cf. [1]). A forward-looking act is basically a new initiative taken by a speaker; for example a
new assertion made apropos of nothing, or a question about some new topic. A backward-looking act is one which
is taken in response to an earlier dialogue act; for example the answer to a question, or the acknowledgement of
an assertion. The pairing of a forward-looking dialogue act with an appropriate subsequent backward-looking act is
referred to as a subdialogue.
We adopt a simple model of communication of facts between two participants. In our model, if a forward-looking
assertion by one speaker is accepted by the addressee, both participants simply add the asserted fact to their copy of
the ‘common ground’—i.e. to their copy of the context DRS. In more elaborate models (e.g. [35]), the grounding of
a forward-looking act is also associated with changes in the obligations of the dialogue participants. (Obligations are
particularly useful for modelling commands. In Traum’s model, if a dialogue participant accepts a command issued
by another participant, what is grounded by both participants is an obligation on the former to obey the command.)
For simplicity, we do not model obligations in our current system.
Fig. 1. Utterance structure for The dog chased a cat.
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Some utterances can have both forward-looking and backward-looking components [35]. For instance, a clarifica-
tion question responds to the previous utterance, but is also an initiative which itself needs to be responded to. Such
acts allow subdialogues to be nested inside one another [18,25]. Here is an example of a subdialogue involving a
clarification question.
(1) Nancy: Pass the cup! (U1)
Sid: Which cup? (U2)
Nancy: The big one. (U3)
Sid: Here you are. (U4)
As well as a representation of the common ground, both participants need to maintain a representation of the forward-
looking acts which still need to be responded to. These acts are sometimes referred to as the dialogue stack (after [19]),
or as a set of questions under discussion, unordered except for one maximal question, which is what a backward-
looking act is assumed to respond to (cf. [16]). In our system, we use a stack to hold the updates associated with
the forward-looking acts which have not yet been responded to, and we refer to the update on top of the stack as
‘maximal’. The stack and the common ground together comprise a complete representation of the current dialogue
context. Fig. 2 shows the contents of the stack which would be maintained by Sid, at several points during Dialogue 1.
Each box in this diagram is a shorthand for the kind of dialogue act representation illustrated in Fig. 1. After Nancy’s
first utterance, there is one forward-looking act in the dialogue context. This act contains a presupposition which
Sid can resolve in multiple ways, indicated in the diagram with a question mark. After Sid’s first utterance, there
are two acts on the stack, Sid’s being maximal. Nancy’s second utterance is therefore understood as responding to
Sid’s question, and removing Sid’s question from the stack. But note that it also has the side-effect of resolving the
ambiguity in Nancy’s first utterance, which is now maximal on the stack. Since this is the only remaining utterance
on the stack, Nancy’s second utterance is assumed to respond to this, and complete the outer subdialogue. (Later in
the paper, in Section 9, we envisage some other ‘non-standard’ ways of updating material in the stack, as part of our
model of disagreements.)
A final point to note about our model of dialogue structure is that it is geared to ‘written’ (or more precisely,
typed) dialogues. Clearly, this form of dialogue is somewhat unusual; however, we believe that most of the principles
we implement carry over to spoken conversations. Our model of multi-speaker conversation is likewise intended to
generalise to spoken interactions, except in a few circumstances relating to varieties of interruption, as described in
Section 10.
2.3. The interpretation-response pipeline
The basic organisational unit in our two-speaker dialogue system is a pipeline of processes acting on an initial user
utterance; see Fig. 3. The user’s utterance is typed into a text box, in either English or Ma¯ori. Each user utterance must
consist of a single sentence (or sentence fragment); at this stage we do not support multi-sentence utterances from
the user. The user’s sentence is first parsed, using an HPSG-style Ma¯ori-English grammar [5]. (It can also operate
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Fig. 4. Order of processes for user initiatives (a) and system initiatives (b).
with the English Resource Grammar; [10].) We use the LKB system [9] as our sentence parser. Each parse returned
by the parser is given to the dialogue attachment module, which computes a corresponding update of the sort illus-
trated in Fig. 1. One of these updates is then selected, using information drawn from a variety of sources, such as
a statistical grammar and a mechanism for preferring interpretations which are easy to incorporate into the current
discourse context (see [28]). The dialogue manager then formulates a suitable response utterance—for instance, the
answer to a question, an acknowledgement of an assertion, or a clarification question [27]. The response is formulated
as an MRS, and this MRS is then realised using LKB’s sentence generator, consulting the same grammar as was used
during parsing.
2.4. Transition relevance points
There are various points in a dialogue at which either participant can talk next. Such points are called transition-
relevance points [30]. We can define these points as being the points at which the stack of forward-looking dialogue
acts is empty. (This departs slightly from Sacks et al.’s use of the term, which predated the notion of a dialogue stack.)
In dialogue theory, much has been written about how a speaker is selected in such cases, from Sacks et al. onwards.
Most of this work has focused on the important role played by non-verbal cues in negotiating which speaker talks next.
These cues can relate to eye gaze, gestures or prosody (see e.g. [8,14]). There is clear evidence that in a conversational
medium where such cues are absent, turn-taking is qualitatively different. Other important factors are interpersonal,
to do with differences in social status of the participants (see e.g. [7]).
In the design of a dialogue system, a decision about what to do at transition-relevance points primarily reflects the
purpose for which the system is designed; it implements a specific policy on the part of the designers. In our case,
the system is designed to give a student the opportunity to practise conversing in a foreign language; accordingly, we
should allow the student the first opportunity to take an initiative, but also allow the student to concede this opportunity
if (s)he cannot or does not want to take it. The policy of the system as regards transition-relevance points is thus always
to pass initiative to the user, but to allow the user to concede the initiative by hitting ‘return’.
The two possible sequences of processes after a transition relevance point are shown in Fig. 4. Fig. 4(a) shows the
case where the user takes the initiative; Fig. 4(b) shows the case where the user concedes the initiative. Each case
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to a system initiative.
If the user concedes the initiative, there is an extra step prior to the interpretation-response pipeline where the
system runs an initiative-generation routine [32] to select either an assertion (from its private knowledge base of
facts) or a question (from a prespecified agenda of questions to ask). In this routine, a number of candidate initiatives
are created and evaluated in terms of their educational utility and relevance to the current topic of discussion. The
highest-scoring of these is realised, and another user utterance is then solicited, which provides the input to the
utterance-interpretation pipeline. The user utterance received might be an explicit response to the system’s initiative,
or it might be a new initiative, signalling an implicit acknowledgement of the system’s initiative. The system’s response
to an explicit response is simply to return to a transition-relevance point (i.e. to return the initiative to the user). Its
response to a new initiative is first to assume that an explicit acknowledgement was given and process this, and if
successful, to continue to process the new initiative.
3. Key concepts for the multi-speaker system
In the remainder of the paper we discuss how the two-speaker dialogue system just introduced is extended to a
multi-speaker scenario. We begin in this section by introducing a number of features of multi-speaker conversation
which have consequences for the design of the dialogue management algorithm.
The consequences are of different types, which we will identify explicitly. Firstly, we are not able to recreate all the
subtleties and complexities of naturally-occurring multi-speaker conversations; we must make certain simplifications,
which we will term assumptions. Secondly, our dialogue system has a particular purpose, and it is designed to deliver
a specific range of dialogues which best fulfil this purpose. Constraints which relate to the purpose of the system will
be termed policies. Finally, the system encodes various constraints which we believe reflect genuine contingencies
in human multi-speaker conversations. These will be termed principles. We will also be explicit about situations in
which system-played characters cut corners by sharing representations privately among themselves. This is normally
done either for the sake of efficiency, or to aid the system’s educational goal.
3.1. Autonomy of participants
Multi-speaker conversations in real life are not scripted, but rather emerge from an interaction of the individual
dialogue-management strategies of each speaker. We suggest that it is easiest to simulate multi-speaker dialogue by
modelling each system character as an autonomous individual, with its own representation of the current information
state, executing its own updates on this state, and making its own responses. For instance, we want to allow for the
possibility that different characters interpret an utterance in different ways, have different stores of private knowledge,
and generate different responses to a user utterance. Thus at some level the core loop of the dialogue-management
algorithm should be an iteration over each system character, executing a private interpretation algorithm for each; each
character should also make its own decision about how to respond to a given utterance. We thus envisage a high-level
conversation management algorithm implementing various loops over all system-played characters, and mediating
various types of private communication between them. The details of the conversation management algorithm are
given in Section 4.
The basic decision to loop a single dialogue-management algorithm over each system character already requires
an important simplifying assumption to be stated:
Assumption 1. Each system character implements the same dialogue management algorithm.
In real human–human conversation, there are likely to be individual differences between the precise ‘dialogue
management algorithm’ implemented by each participant. But at least to the extent that the structure of conversations
is a matter of convention, the assumption is a reasonable one.
3.2. Overhearers
In a two-speaker dialogue, both participants are actively involved at all times, because each utterance is generated
by one participant and addressed to the other. In a multi-speaker conversation, the notion of ‘participant’ is less
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not being addressed, but is nonetheless following the conversation, and maintaining a representation of it. In real
conversations, the concept of an overhearer admits of degrees; at one extreme, an overhearer can be highly involved
in a conversation (what Goffman, [17] calls a ‘ratified side-participant’), and at the other, an overhearer might simply
catch fragments of a conversation, with most of it going uninterpreted. When designing a dialogue manager, it is
important to define what kind of overhearing to support. As a simplifying assumption, we will define all overhearers
as being of the former type.
Assumption 2. Every participant in a conversation must actively interpret every utterance in the conversation.
The definition of ‘active interpretation’ will be taken up in more detail when we discuss interruptions in Section 10.
In the meantime, Assumption 2 has several ramifications. Firstly, it allows that one can be a participant in a conver-
sation without ever saying anything at all—all that is required is that each participant maintain a representation of
what has been said, so that they could contribute to the conversation if the need or desire arises. Secondly, it illumi-
nates the role of the addressee of an utterance: the issue of who is addressed by an utterance is important primarily
in determining who responds to it, rather than who interprets it. Finally, it has a practical ramification for the dia-
logue management algorithm: each utterance arising in the conversation must be processed in a loop defined over all
characters played by the system. Within this loop, each character must interpret the utterance and update the common
ground accordingly.
3.3. Consistency between participants
As mentioned in the introduction, in our initial implementation, we also make some simplifying assumptions about
consistency between conversation participants. Firstly, we make an assumption about the initial private beliefs of
participants.
Assumption 3. Participants never have cause to disagree with one another. I.e. no assertion made in the dialogue is
inconsistent with any of the participants’ private knowledge.
Secondly, we make an assumption about consistency between the representations of the common ground which
each participant privately maintains.
Assumption 4. There are no discrepancies between the common ground represented by each system character.
In fact, if we assume the common ground is initially empty for each participant, Assumption 4 is a corollary of
Assumptions 2 and 1. Since each participant interprets each utterance which is made, and each character implements
the same dialogue-management algorithm, it is guaranteed that their common grounds will be updated in similar ways.
Naturally, since each participant has their own copy of the common ground, they will use different variables, but apart
from this, they will be identical. (Note that there can nonetheless be differences in the dialogue stacks maintained by
different participants. The point is that once information is grounded, these differences are resolved.)
3.4. Groups of participants
In a multi-speaker conversation, participants can be addressed singly, but also in groups. The group in question
might be all the other participants, but it might also be a subset of participants. In either case, a group response
is required by the set of addressed participants. For the conversation manager, therefore, the general case is one in
which one participant addresses a group of participants—though it may frequently be that this group has just a single
member.
It is easy enough to understand what is meant by addressing a group, but the concept of responding as a group is
more tricky. At one ‘democratic’ extreme, we might imagine a private discussion between members of the responding
group, with an agreed-upon response being delivered by a spokesperson. At the other ‘autocratic’ extreme, we might
imagine a scenario in which one member of the group has authority to speak on behalf of the group without prior
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one where the process of arriving at a consensus within the group is incorporated into the process of delivering the
response; i.e. in which members of the group generate responses individually, and are able to agree or disagree with,
or to elaborate on, responses made by other members. If the respondents were genuinely autonomous, they would
have to decide in parallel, in real time, whether or not to begin producing a response, opening up the possibility of two
speakers talking simultaneously. In real conversation, much has been written about how such conflicts are resolved,
but in our case, we will simply stipulate that these individual responses are delivered in strict sequence:
Assumption 5. Group responses are realised as a sequence of utterances by individuals in the group.
There is a certain amount of empirical evidence to suggest that group responses can be delivered in sequence in
this way. For instance, Ginzburg and Fernandez [15] note that the average distance between short answers and the
questions they answer is considerably larger in multi-speaker dialogue than in two-party dialogue, and suggest that
this is because groups of respondents are taking it in turn to respond.2
Assumption 5 means that a group response will be implemented in the conversation manager as a loop over system
characters. Recall that we have already envisaged a core loop over each system character for their private processes
of utterance interpretation and response preparation. In the system, these two loops are separate: the utterance in-
terpretation/response preparation loop can be understood as modelling processes which occur simultaneously in the
system characters before any overt responses are made, while the overt response loop models a temporal sequence of
dialogue acts. (In fact, the overt response loop actually iterates over all system characters, to allow for the possibility
of a response from any system character, whether they are an addressee or an overhearer.) As a consequence of these
decisions, we must also envisage a change to the way utterances are represented: the speaker of an utterance is still
a single individual, but the addressee field is now a group entity which can contain one or more individuals.
4. The conversation management algorithm
To summarise: the central design decision motivated in Section 3 is to model each system character relatively
separately by extending the two-speaker dialogue management routines described in Section 2, and to introduce
an overarching conversation management algorithm which implements loops over individual system characters and
manages various forms of private communication between them.
There are three basic loops: one for utterance interpretation, one for the generation of initiatives, and one for the
generation of responses. These will be considered in turn in the current section.
4.1. The utterance interpretation loop
User utterances occur at various points during the conversation: as initiatives (assertions and questions) and as
responses (acknowledgements and answers). All these utterance types are initially processed in the same way by
the conversation management system. The system begins by parsing the user’s sentence just once, to produce a set
of alternative syntactic analyses. Each system character then independently computes an update for each syntactic
analysis, and begins to select amongst these using a mixture of dialogue attachment and statistical parsing techniques.
Any remaining ambiguities must be resolved by clarification questions. However, to avoid a proliferation of clarifi-
cation questions, the conversation management system arbitrarily chooses one lead character to ask these questions.
When the lead character has asked enough questions to derive a single update, the system communicates the syntactic
analysis associated with this update to the other system characters, to enable them to identify the selected update
themselves. (Recall we are currently assuming that all characters maintain the same common ground, modulo differ-
ences in private variable names. For this reason, they all compute an equivalent update for each syntactic analysis.) For
purely syntactic ambiguities, the lead character’s clarification subdialogue with the user is not explicitly represented
2 Ginzburg and Fernandez distinguish between answers and other backward-looking acts like acknowledgements, which are assumed always to
be local. Our model allows long-distance acknowledgements as well (see for instance Examples 2 and 3), but also permits local acknowledgements
(see the discussion of inter-respondent dialogue acts in Section 4.3).
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ing the appropriate update. Clarification subdialogues for resolving semantic ambiguities are broadcast to all system
characters; see Example 3 for a discussion of this scenario. In summary: at the end of the utterance interpretation
process, each system character has computed a single update for the user’s utterance.
4.2. Initiative selection
As in a two-person dialogue, we can define a transition-relevance point as a point in the dialogue where the stack
is empty, and where any speaker is free to take a new initiative. Recall from Section 2.4 that in human-to-human
dialogue, the next speaker is determined by a range of social and nonverbal cues; however in our system, it should be
a matter of policy. We can continue to implement the policy of the two-speaker system, by giving the initiative first to
the user, but if the user concedes it, we must decide which system character talks next. Recall again from Section 2.4
that system initiatives are selected by generating a set of candidate initiatives and evaluating each of these. In our
multi-speaker system, each system-played character generates its best initiative in this way, and the next speaker is
determined by which character has the best initiative.
Policy 1. If initiative is passed to the system at a transition-relevance point, each character generates its best initiative;
the character whose initiative scores highest is selected to make the next utterance.
Note that this policy provides another instance of ‘private’ communication between system-played characters; the
characters share information about the score of their best initiative. To some extent, this private communication stands
in for communication which in a human dialogue would be carried out using nonverbal signals.
Transition-relevance points break a conversation up into smaller, relatively independent units. In a system where
conversations are simulated to pursue a particular system goal, the decision about what happens at a transition-
relevance point is relatively simple; in our case, for instance, we just need to implement the above policy. The bulk
of the work of the dialogue system is in determining the (often complex) information-state updates and dialogue acts
which are triggered by the initiative which follows a transition-relevance point. We will deal with these in Section 4.3.
4.3. Response processing
The first dialogue act after a transition-relevance point can be of four different types: an assertion by the user,
a question by the user, an assertion by a system character, or a question by a system character. The conversation
management algorithm treats these situations separately. A user assertion or question must be interpreted (by all the
system characters) and then responded to appropriately (by those characters who were addressed). A question or
assertion from a system character must first be communicated to the other system characters. If it is addressed to the
user, the user’s response must be obtained, and this response must then be interpreted by all system characters. If it is
addressed to another system character, this character must generate a response, which must likewise be communicated
to all other characters. In this section, we will consider the four situations in more detail.
4.3.1. Response to a user assertion
If the user’s initial utterance after a transition-relevance point is declarative, it is interpreted as expressing an
assertion. In this context, the conversation manager first executes the utterance interpretation routine described in
Section 4.1, at the end of which each system character has a single update. The algorithm then iterates over each
system character, in an arbitrarily chosen order. Each character first determines whether they are an addressee of the
user’s utterance—see Section 5.1 for how this is determined. If they are not, then they remain silent. If they are, then
they consult the set of responses given so far by members of the responding group. If this is empty, they are obliged
to deliver an explicit response. If not, they choose at random between issuing an acknowledgement and remaining
silent. This implements two general principles about group responses, which both assume (cf. Assumption 5) that
group responses are delivered in strict sequence. The first distinguishes between the initial respondent and subsequent
respondents.
Principle 1. At least one member of a responding group is obliged to respond. Other members can choose to make
subsequent responses or to remain silent.
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The second principle concerns the interpretation of silence from a subsequent respondent.
Principle 2. If an assertion is acknowledged by one member of a responding group, silence from a subsequent member
is understood as an implicit acknowledgement.
An example of a sequentially delivered group acknowledgement is given in Dialogue 2.
(2) Mary [to John and Bill]: The train is late.
John: Okay.
Bill: Okay.
Note that both respondents give an explicit response in this case.
An extension to the dialogue stack To cater for group responses, the notion of the dialogue stack must be somewhat
extended. If the initial response by the first member of the group was simply pushed onto the stack, then a subsequent
response by another group member would be understood as a response to the previous response, rather than (as it
should be) to the original forward-looking act. The best approach is to reconstrue the stack as a tree of DRSs, as
proposed e.g. within the SDRT formalisation of discourse and dialogue structure developed by Asher and Lascarides
([4]; see also [2,31]). In a dialogue context, an incoming utterance can have both a parent DRS in the tree (encoding the
forward-looking utterance which it responds to) and sister DRSs (encoding other separate responses to this forward-
looking utterance). (This is especially clear in [31].) In our case, therefore, the ‘stack’ for Dialogue 2 (we will continue
to refer to it as ‘the stack’) will be as shown in Fig. 5. Bill’s response attaches to the right frontier of the tree, as a child
of Mary’s forward-looking dialogue act and a sister to John’s response. Note that when Bill generates his response,
each system character’s tree is updated in this way.
Note that one of the respondents may need to ask a clarification question, as in Dialogue 3:
(3) Mary [to John/Bill]: The train is late.
Bill: What train?
Mary: The London train.
Bill: Okay.
John: Okay.
Fig. 6 shows the state of the stack at various points during this dialogue. In this dialogue, Bill is chosen as the
first respondent. He has a clarification question, so he is the ‘lead character’ in this case. He asks the clarification
question and gets a reply from Mary, allowing him to create the stack shown at time t1. Since this clarification
exchange concerns semantic interpretation, it is broadcast to the other character, John, who creates a similar stack.
Both characters then process the question-answer pair on the stack independently to generate the updated stack shown
at time t2. Finally, each character responds in turn to the updated assertion. Time t3 shows the stack they both create
when this process is complete.
Note that the order in which respondents are chosen to respond to Mary’s updated assertion is also chosen
randomly—it might therefore be that John gives his acknowledgement before Bill does. Note also that the updated
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assertion might engender an additional clarification question from the first respondent chosen next, allowing for a se-
quence of clarification subdialogues about a single assertion. Finally, note that Bill and John’s acknowledgements are
interpreted with ‘wide’ scope, over the whole of Mary’s updated assertion, rather than narrowly as acknowledgements
to her answer to Bill’s clarification question. These latter ‘narrow’ acknowledgements are not given explicitly, to avoid
odd repetitions of okay.
4.3.2. Response to a user question
If the user’s initiative after a transition-relevance point is a question, the conversation manager begins as before,
by executing the utterance interpretation routine to compute an update for each character, and then iterating over each
character in an arbitrary order to give each the chance to respond. As before, each character first determines whether
it is in the addressee group, and if it is, it consults the earlier responses when planning its answer. But for question-
answering, the planning process is more complicated, since the answer to a question contains more content than the
acknowledgement of an assertion. Firstly, a later member of a responding group might want to express agreement or
disagreement with an answer given by an earlier respondent, or to indicate that the information provided by an earlier
respondent is new to them. These inter-respondent dialogue acts are often realised by stock phrases, such as That’s
right for agreement, No for disagreement and Really? for indicating novelty of the previous response. Secondly, a
later respondent can provide an explicit propositional answer of his or her own. This may reiterate an earlier answer,
or expand on it, or contradict it.
Given Assumption 3, that there are no disagreements, we can adopt a simple model of group answers. We begin by
proposing a simple template for answers from subsequent members of the responding group.
Principle 3. In a group response to a question, after the first answer has been given, each subsequent answer consists
of a (possibly empty) inter-respondent dialogue act followed by a (possibly empty) propositional answer.
To illustrate, consider the following dialogue:
(4) Mary [to John and Bill]: What shape is the world?
John: It’s round.
Bill: That’s right. It’s round.
Bill’s utterance is an example of a subsequent response to a question in which an explicit inter-respondent dialogue
act (signalling agreement) is given, as well as an explicit propositional answer.
We now need to consider the meaning of an ‘empty’ inter-respondent dialogue act. We suggest that if a subsequent
respondent disagrees, they are obliged to state this explicitly—again, see Section 9 for details. In the meantime,
an empty inter-respondent act can be interpreted either as acknowledgement of novel information in the previous
response(s) or as agreement with previous response(s), or some mixture of the two.
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In our implementation, we only deliver an explicit agreement if the respondent agrees with all the responses given
by all respondents to speak so far, and only deliver an explicit novelty signal if all the material presented so far is
novel. But other more local interpretations of That’s right and Really? are certainly also possible.
We turn now to the second component of a subsequent response: a positive formulation of that speaker’s answer.
The main question here is whether a subsequent respondent should reiterate portions of the answer which have already
been given. Reiteration serves a number of purposes which we do not want to attempt to model here. Our principle
simply asserts that it is an option:
Principle 5. In a subsequent response to a question, a speaker is able to reiterate material already provided by an
earlier respondent.
In our implementation, a subsequent respondent only reiterates if there has been just one response so far. Reiterating
just some of the responses so far given could be interpreted as disagreement with the other responses, and reiterating
all responses is long-winded for anything more than a single response.
4.3.3. Response to a system character assertion
If the initiative is passed to the system after a transition-relevance point, the system chooses a character to produce
an utterance. If this utterance is an assertion, it must be interpreted by each other system character, as well as by the
user. It must then be responded to. The issue of who responds is determined by who the addressee (or addressee group)
of the assertion is. We will consider how to determine the addressee group in Section 5.1; in the present section we
will consider the interpretation and response loops processes implemented by the conversation manager in response
to a system character assertion.
To begin with, both the user and the other system characters must interpret the assertion. Since it arose from a
system character, there is no need for the other system characters to interpret it from scratch; instead, to avoid having
to resolve syntactic ambiguities in the assertion, they are given a copy of the MRS from which it was generated
(another instance of private communication between system characters). A loop is then executed over the non-speaker
system characters (in an arbitrary order) in which they each interpret this MRS as an update to their own private
information state.
Once this process is complete, a loop is executed over members of the addressee group, to allow each addressee to
respond. If the user is a member of this group, we give the user the opportunity to respond first, as a matter of policy.
This is partly to encourage the user to participate actively in the conversation, and partly to avoid the need to process
inter-respondent dialogue acts coming from the user.
Policy 2. If the user is part of the addressee group of a forward-looking utterance, the user is given the first opportunity
to respond. After this, the order of the remaining members of the group is specified arbitrarily.
The user response is processed using the utterance-interpretation pipeline, in the normal way. (If the user hits
‘return’, this is interpreted as an implicit acknowledgement of the system character’s assertion, after which the system
generates a new initiative.) If the addressee group includes system characters, they respond in turn in the same way as
subsequent respondents to a user assertion, as described above.
4.3.4. Response to a system character question
The initiative taken by a system character can be a question, as well as an assertion. The process in this case is
largely similar. We first execute a loop over all non-speaking system characters to allow each to interpret the question
MRS as an update. If the addressee group of the question includes the user, we again allow the user to provide the
first response, and then loop over any system characters in the group to allow them to add to this response (this tactic
is already covered by Policy 2). Note that if the user is responding to a question from a system character, it is not
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presses ‘return’, the system responds by asking the user to answer the question.3
5. Deciding on the addressee
Now that the basic operation of the conversation manager has been outlined, we turn to one of the central issues for
a multi-party dialogue system: how to determine the addressee (or more properly, the addressee group). This question
is interpreted differently depending on whether the utterance is being generated by a system character or by the user. In
the former case, the issue is firstly one of content selection (the character needs to choose an addressee to talk to) and
then one of sentence planning (it needs to make sure the chosen addressee is unambiguously identified in its utterance).
In the latter case, it is a matter of utterance interpretation; the system needs to work out which character(s) the user is
addressing, so as to determine which character(s) respond to it. In Section 5.1, we consider the utterance interpretation
perspective; in Section 5.2, we consider the generation perspective. (Naturally, the assumptions, principles and policies
we propose for interpretation and generation are consistent with one another.)
5.1. Determining the addressee in utterance interpretation
5.1.1. Explicit identification of the addressee
There are several methods of indicating the addressee group of an utterance explicitly. Some explicit methods are
entirely nonverbal—in particular, methods involving speaker gaze and gesture. However, our system does not have the
multimodal capabilities to simulate these nonverbal methods.4 We limit ourselves to explicit linguistic identifications
of the addressee, using what we will call an addressee term. Some examples of addressee terms are given below.
(5) How are you doing, Bill?
(6) Janet, pass me that wrench.
(7) Bill and Janet, you have not been listening to me.
(8) Hello everyone.
(9) Not tonight, Josephine.
Note that these examples involve different kinds of dialogue act: a question, a command, an assertion, a greeting and
an answer. We believe that sentences expressing any type of dialogue act can be modified with an addressee term.
A simple principle about addressee terms can be given:
Principle 6. If the speaker uses an addressee term in an utterance, this term identifies the addressee of the utterance.
5.1.2. Structurally-defined addressees
In many situations, the utterance which is maximal on the stack imposes strong constraints on the addressee of
an incoming utterance, allowing the addressee to be determined even if there is no explicit addressee term. One such
situation is if the speaker’s utterance expresses a backward-looking act.
Principle 7. If a speaker’s utterance expresses a backward-looking dialogue act, its structural addressee is the speaker
of the forward-looking dialogue act which is maximal on the stack.
In the following dialogue, for instance, John’s reply to Mary’s question is taken by Principle 7 to be addressed to
Mary.
3 As a robustness feature, after three unsuccessful answers, the system character’s question is simply removed from the stack, and the system
returns to a transition-relevance point.
4 Our system does have a talking head interface with a limited ability to track the human user with a camera and identify them visually; see King
[22]. However, the system can only track one user at a time.
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John: It’s round.
(Naturally, if John responds with an utterance which cannot be interpreted as a reply to Mary, it is an ill-formed
contribution to the dialogue, and the question of whom it is addressed to is not raised.)
One situation where Principle 7 is not precise enough is in group response scenarios, where an utterance contains
both a response dialogue act and an inter-respondent dialogue act, as discussed in Section 4.3. In one sense, it does
not matter who the addressee is in either of these dialogue acts, because the algorithm given in Section 4.3 already
controls the sequence of speakers in group responses. (Note that the addressee selection routine is not invoked when
each response in a group response is being interpreted.) So to the extent that the addressee of an utterance determines
who goes next, it is not important to define the addressee of these utterances. However, at a surface level, it is still
possible to use personal pronouns in group responses, as in the following cases:
(11) Mary: John, Bill, am I late?
John: Yes you are.
(a) Bill: That’s right, she is.
(b) Bill: That’s right, you are.
Both of Bill’s responses ((a) and (b)) are quite legitimate. However, our system must decide on an addressee before
being able to interpret such personal pronouns. To cater for such examples, we simply assume that the addressee is the
questioner, rather than someone else in the responding group. The issue of how to resolve pronouns like she in Bill’s
response (a) is left as further work.
Assumption 6. An utterance made by a speaker as part of a group response is assumed (for the purposes of pronoun
interpretation) to be addressed to the speaker of the utterance being responded to.
A second situation in which the utterance maximal on the stack places constraints on the addressee of an incoming
utterance is for a forward-looking act inside a nested subdialogue.
Principle 8. If an utterance initiates a subdialogue when the stack is not empty, then its structural addressee is the
speaker of the utterance maximal on the stack.
An example of Principle 8 is given below.
(12) Sue: Shall we go to the cinema tonight, Bob?
Bob: What’s on?
By Principle 8, the structural addressee of Bob’s utterance is Sue.
5.1.3. Interactions between explicit and structurally-defined addressees
What happens if an explicit addressee term is given in a context where a structural addressee is already defined?
There are two basic possibilities. Firstly, the explicit addressee term can be identical to the structural addressee. For
instance:
(13) Josephine [to Bert]: Shall we watch a video?
Bert: Not tonight, Josephine.5 I have a headache.
Secondly, an addressee term can be inconsistent with the structurally specified addressee. For instance:
5 We believe that an explicit addressee term in such cases carries connotations of intimacy or of a heightened emotional connection. This seems
a good example.
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Bert: # Not tonight, Frank. I have a headache.
Such cases can conceivably arise—for instance if we assume that Josephine was asking a question on Frank’s behalf.
If they do, then Principle 6 conflicts with Principle 7. It makes sense to give Principle 6 priority in such a case, but
also for the system to note that the speaker has broken one of the normal rules of conversation.
Another kind of inconsistency between a structural and an explicit addressee term is for an utterance initiating a
nested subdialogue, as in the following example.
(15) Sue: Shall we go to the cinema tonight, Bob?
Bob: Svetlana, do you want to come?
Svetlana: Good idea.
Bob: Okay.
According to Principle 8, Bob’s first utterance should be addressed to the speaker of the utterance maximal on the
stack, but he is explicitly addressing Svetlana. Naturally, priority should again be given to the explicit addressee; thus
Principle 6 trumps Principle 8. However, violating Principle 8 again feels like breaking one of the rules of normal
conversation. (Note in passing that once Svetlana’s utterance closes her subdialogue with Bob, the utterance maximal
on the stack is Sue’s question; therefore Bob’s second utterance (a backward-looking act) is correctly understood as
being addressed to Sue, by Principle 7.)
5.1.4. Default addressees
One final way of specifying an addressee is by default. This rule applies when there is no structurally-defined
addressee; in other words, at a transition-relevance point.
Principle 9. If a forward-looking act F is made when the stack is empty, then the default addressee is the set of
participants involved in the previous subdialogue, minus the speaker of F . (If there is no previous subdialogue, the
default addressee is the set of all participants minus the speaker of F .)
Here is an example of Principle 9 in action:
(16) Sue [addressing Bob and Mary]: Shall we go to the cinema tonight?
Bob: Good idea.
Mary: Yes, good idea.
Bob: What film do you want to see?
Sue’s first statement, and Bob and Mary’s responses to it, together constitute a subdialogue. Bob’s second utterance
(What film do you want to see?) is a forward-looking act. Since there is no explicit addressee term, we assume by
Principle 9 that it is addressed to Sue and Mary.
Note that Principle 9 is expressed in terms of participants, rather than speakers. Thus if Mary was silent in Exam-
ple 16, she would still be counted as involved in the previous subdialogue, and Bob’s question would be addressed
to her as well as to Sue. (An alternative principle could give more prominence to active speakers in the previous
subdialogue; which is preferable is an empirical matter, which requires further investigation.)
Note also that the principle also covers the case where the speaker was not involved in the preceding subdialogue.
Here is an example of this:
(17) Sue [addressing Bob]: Shall we go to the cinema tonight?
Bob: Good idea.
Mary: Can I come?
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should be interpreted as addressed to both participants, unless she includes an explicit addressee modifier indicating
otherwise.
Note that while it is jarring to override a structural addressee with an explicit addressee term, the default addressee
at a transition relevance point is easy to override.
(18) Sue [addressing Bob and Mary]: Shall we go to the cinema tonight?
Bob: Good idea.
Mary: Yes, good idea.
Bob: Mary, do you know any good films?
Thus Principle 6 also trumps Principle 9.
5.1.5. An algorithm for determining the addressee
We have specified preference orderings on Principles 6–9 in cases where they conflict; basically Principle 6 over-
rides other principles (i.e. an explicit addressee is preferred whenever it is given). The addressee selection algorithm
can thus be stated as follows:
If [there is an explicit addressee]
then [addressee = explicit addressee]
else
if [there is something on the stack]
then [addressee = speaker of the
utterance maximal on the stack]
else
if [there is a previous subdialogue]
then [addressee = the set of speakers
in the most recent subdialogue
minus the current speaker]
else [addressee = all participants
minus the current speaker]
An algorithm for determining the addressee of an utterance in multiparty dialogue was recently proposed by Traum
[36]. His algorithm gives preference to an explicit addressee, as ours does. In the absence of an explicit addressee, the
addressee is defined in relation to the previous utterance. If the current utterance has the same speaker as the previous
addressee, it is assumed to have the same addressee too; otherwise, its addressee is assumed to be the speaker of the
previous utterance. This algorithm differs from ours mainly in its behaviour in relation to group responses. Consider
the following example:
(19) Sue [to Bob and Mary]: Who’s best at maths?
Bob: You are.
Mary: Yes, you are.
In Traum’s algorithm, Bob’s utterance is correctly identified as addressing Sue. But Mary’s utterance will be inter-
preted as addressing Bob, who is the previous speaker. Traum’s algorithm also makes no special provision for the
default addressee group at a transition-relevance point. After Mary’s utterance in the above example, Bob, Mary and
Sue are all free to speak next. In Traum’s algorithm, an utterance by Mary would be interpreted as addressing Bob
(since Mary’s previous utterance is understood as addressing Bob), while an utterance by Bob or Sue would be in-
terpreted as addressing Mary (since Mary is the speaker of the previous utterance). In our algorithm, the utterance in
each case is interpreted as addressing the set of all three participants minus the speaker.
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When a system character generates an utterance, it must choose whom to address, and whether this addressee needs
to be signalled. There are two situations to consider: one where the utterance responds to a forward-looking dialogue
act, and one where it is a new initiative.
In the former case, our response-processing algorithm ensures that system characters always respond to a forward-
looking act if it is addressed to them (see Section 4.3). Therefore, the addressee of the response is always the
structurally-defined one, and hence no addressee term is required. As a matter of policy, we choose not to add an
‘optional’ addressee in this case.
Policy 3. If the addressee of a system character utterance is structurally defined, no explicit addressee term is given.
If a character must generate an initiative, as a matter of policy we require the character to address the user, or a group
including the user.
Policy 4. When generating an initiative, a system character will select an addressee group including the user.
In this case, if the addressee group includes the user, Policy 2 ensures that the user is given the first opportunity to
respond. Policy 4 thus provides for a maximum amount of user involvement following a system initiative. Once an
addressee is selected, we need to determine whether to include an explicit addressee term in the generated utterance.
If the selected addressee group differs from the default addressee group, then we must include an explicit addressee
term to override the default, given that Principle 6 overrides Principle 9. If the selected addressee group is the same,
we are not obliged to include an explicit addressee term, but we can choose to do so. We currently choose not to; our
policy is thus as follows:
Policy 5. If the addressee of a system character utterance differs from the default addressee group, an explicit addressee
term is given; otherwise no explicit addressee term is given.
In our teaching system, it might be helpful to address the user explicitly even when he is the default addressee,
to help build a rapport with the user. (‘Where are you from, John?’) So there are many interesting variations on this
policy which it would be useful to consider.
6. Personal pronouns and addressee terms in a multi-speaker system
As well as a model of conversation management, another important consideration for a multi-speaker dialogue
system is the semantics of expressions referring to dialogue participants, in particular personal pronouns and addressee
terms. In this section, we will present a model of these expressions which can be integrated into the conversation
management framework just described.
6.1. Personal pronouns
6.1.1. The syntax of personal pronouns
Personal pronouns are devices which allow a speaker to refer anaphorically to him/herself, to the addressee, and
to third parties. In English, there are three dimensions of variation for pronouns: number (singular/plural), person
(first/second/third) and case (nominative/accusative).
In other languages, the pronoun system encodes other possibilities. For instance, in Ma¯ori, the language we are
particularly interested in, there are three values for the number dimension (singular/dual/plural). Moreover, for dual
and plural first person pronouns, there is a further distinction between ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ pronouns, depending
on whether the addressee is included in the set of people including the speaker. (Thus there are four distinct pronouns
corresponding to the English pronoun we.) First- and second-person Ma¯ori pronouns are shown in Table 1.
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First-person and second-person pronouns in Ma¯ori
First person Second person
Singular au/ahau koe
“I/me” “you (by yourself)”
Dual Inclusive Exclusive
ta¯ua ma¯ua ko¯rua
“you and I” “him/her and I” “you two”
Plural Inclusive Exclusive
ta¯tou ma¯tou koutou
“us lot (including you)” “us lot (but not you)” “you lot”
Fig. 7. I love you.
6.1.2. The semantics of personal pronouns
All pronouns introduce presuppositions about entities which are already in the discourse context. We will begin by
considering singular pronouns, and then extend to plurals.
In the case of singular pronouns, the story is quite simple: first-person pronouns presuppose an individual who is
the speaker, and second-person pronouns presuppose an individual who is the addressee. For instance, the sentence I
love you introduces presuppositions about the speaker and about the hearer, as illustrated in Fig. 7.
Whereas normal presuppositions are resolved by consulting the contents of the common ground, presuppositions
about the speaker and hearer must be resolved using information about the dialogue act associated with the current
utterance. Recall from Section 2.1 that an utterance has a message field (containing a nucleus and a set of presup-
positions) but also fields for speaker and addressee. Each of these fields takes a discourse referent as its value.
The dialogue management algorithms described in Sections 4 and 5 allow the system to determine the values of these
two fields for any utterance; all that remains is to allow the presupposition resolution system to consult these fields to
resolve these special presuppositions.
To consider the case of plural personal pronouns, we must first provide a semantics for plural objects in general.
To represent plural objects, we use Kamp and Reyle’s [21] method, in which each plural object is associated with
a discourse referent, whose members can be identified with a series of member predicates, and about which other
special predicates such as plural-object and cardinality can be asserted.
Plural personal pronouns denote—or more accurately, presuppose—groups, to which the speaker and addressee
stand in various relationships. For instance, as originally noted by Jespersen [20], we denotes a group which includes
the speaker, and plural you denotes a group which includes the addressee and excludes the speaker. The group denoted
by a plural pronoun must be made salient nonverbally, by pointing, or verbally, by a number of different devices. The
most obvious of these is a plural referring expression, as in Example 20:
(20) Dean: Pearl and I went to the cinema yesterday.
Hank: What did y’all watch?
Dean: We watched ‘Casablanca’.
The first utterance here introduces a group entity composed of Pearl and Dean. In Hank’s responding utterance, y’all
presupposes a salient plural entity one of whose members is the addressee (Dean); the group of Pearl and Dean satisfies
this presupposition. In Dean’s second utterance, we presupposes this same entity.
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entity. Note that the salient group referred to by plural you can coincide with a group of people being addressed. For
example:
(21) Bob: Sue and Mary, are you ready to go?
On the most natural reading of this sentence, you coincides with the group of people being addressed. Our model
accounts quite straightforwardly for a case like this, provided that the addressee of an utterance is always assumed to
be a salient entity in the discourse context.
6.2. Addressee terms
6.2.1. The syntax of addressee terms
Addressee terms function syntactically as sentence modifiers in English and Ma¯ori. It has often been noted that
they are quite different from NPs appearing in ‘argument’ positions in sentences (see e.g. [26]). The most obvious
difference in English is that a determiner is not always required, and in many dialects is ungrammatical:
(22) Hello, mate.
(23) ??Hello, the mate.
Ma¯ori addressee terms have a similar property, but also have an interesting syntax of their own; see [23]. We will
not discuss the syntax of addressee terms any further here; the important issue in the current context is their seman-
tics.
6.2.2. The semantics of addressee terms
What does an addressee term contribute semantically to a sentence? Our suggestion is that it contributes some-
thing very like a presupposition about the addressee, just as second-person pronouns do. For an addressee term, the
presupposition has additional content as well, namely, all the properties which it mentions. Here is an example:
(24) Bob: I love you, Sue.
There are two addressee presuppositions here, one contributed by you, and one by Sue.
There are nonetheless some important differences between the semantics of an addressee term and that of a second-
person pronoun. Firstly, a plural addressee term squarely presupposes the addressee entity, not simply an entity
including the addressee. Secondly, as emphasised in Section 5.1.1, addressee terms function to set the current ad-
dressee, not simply to refer. They therefore have a special status. In our implementation, addressee terms are processed
before other presuppositions, as part of the algorithm for determining the addressee of an incoming utterance. To take
an example, consider a situation where the user is talking to two system-played characters, Sue and Mary:
(25) User: I love you, Sue.
Sue (played by the system): Okay.
User: I love you too, Mary.
When the two system-played characters are interpreting the user’s second utterance, they begin by looking for an
explicit addressee term. When they find it, they set the addressee of the utterance to Mary. Therefore during Mary’s
turn, she will generate a response, while during Sue’s turn, she will remain silent. Note that both characters correctly
resolve you in the second utterance to Mary, because they have both first identified Mary as the addressee.
Modelling this process declaratively, we are effectively augmenting the language we use to represent utterances
to include a special marked presupposition DRS for explicit addressee terms. We require this presupposition to be
resolved before any others, because this resolution process can change the addressee field of the utterance as a
side-effect. The representation for the user’s second utterance in Example 25 is therefore as shown in Fig. 8.
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Our treatment of addressee terms echoes a point made recently by Stalnaker [33].
[T]here is nothing abnormal about a speaker relying, for the interpretation or evaluation of what is said in a speech
act on information that has its source in the speech act event itself. Suppose Alice says “She is the senior senator
from California”, pointing to a woman standing in the corner. A certain woman must be salient for her use of “she”
to be appropriate and successful (. . .), but it was Alice’s speech act, and the accompanying gesture, that made her
salient.
Stalnaker’s point is that elements of an utterance can function to change the context in which the presuppositions
of that same utterance are resolved. The element in his example is a non-verbal one—a pointing gesture. However,
explicit addressee terms function in a similar way. Our model, with two stages of presupposition resolution, captures
this mixture of indexical and referential properties of referring expressions.
7. A session with the multi-speaker dialogue system
In this section, we give a transcript of a multi-speaker conversation generated by our system. As already mentioned,
our system can work with an English grammar (the English Resource Grammar of Copestake et al. [10]) as well as
a Ma¯ori grammar; we have used the English grammar to produce this conversation. The conversation involves a user
(called Ursula) and three system-played characters (Mary, Bill and Sue), and is shown in Fig. 9. In this section, we
briefly run through the conversation, and discuss how it illustrates the important characteristics of our system.
To begin with, in Utterance 1, the user issues a greeting with no explicit addressee term. By default, the addressee
group is assumed to be all the system characters. Each character is given a chance to reply in turn; in this instance,
they all choose to reply (Utterances 2–4).
In Utterance 5, the user tells Mary a fact; the default addressee is overridden by an explicit addressee term (Mary).
The user’s assertion contains two personal pronouns, I and you. Since Mary is the addressee, she responds with Okay
(Utterance 6).
The user then asks a question which is based on her asserted fact and addressed to Mary and Bill (Utterance 7). The
next two utterances (8 and 9) constitute a group response. Bill replies first; his reply shows firstly that he overheard
the user’s assertion to Mary, and secondly that he correctly resolved I and you in that assertion. Mary replies next; her
reply takes the form of an inter-respondent dialogue act (That’s right) followed by a restatement of the previously-
given answer. Note that the two answers use different methods for referring to Mary: Bill uses the proper noun Mary,
while Mary uses me. Note also that neither answer includes an addressee term, since the addressee is structurally
defined.
In Utterance 10, the user makes another assertion, about Sue and John. There is no explicit addressee term here
either, so the addressee group is Bill and Mary by default (the participants involved in the last subdialogue, minus the
speaker). The user’s assertion creates a new group entity, comprising Sue and John. (Note that only one member of
the group is a participant; the other is simply an individual in the common ground.)
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2 Mary: Hello.
3 Bill: Hi.
4 Sue: Hello.
5 User: Mary, I saw you in the office yesterday.
6 Mary: Okay.
7 User: Mary and Bill, who did I see in the office?
8 Bill: You saw Mary in the office.
9 Mary: That’s right, you saw me in the office.
10 User: I saw Sue and John at the cinema.
11 Mary: Okay.
12 Bill: Okay.
13 User: Did I see you at the cinema, Sue?
14 Sue: Yes. You saw John and me at the cinema.
15 User: Okay.
16 User: You seemed happy.
17 Sue: Who seemed happy? Me, or John and me?
18 User: John and you.
19 Sue: Okay.
20 User: 〈return〉
21 Bill: Ursula, where are you going tonight?
22 User: To the shops.
23 Bill: Okay.
24 User: Bill and Mary, where are you going tonight?
25 Bill: Well I am going to a pub tonight.
26 Mary: Really? Well I am going to a restaurant tonight.
Fig. 9. A sample four-person conversation.
In Utterance 13, the user asks Sue a yes-no question containing another instance of the pronoun you. This time
the pronoun is ambiguous, because it can either refer just to Sue (the addressee) or to Sue and John (a salient group
containing Sue). The system finds an answer for the group of Sue and John; its utterance disambiguation routine
is set up to prefer questions which it can answer positively, so the question is interpreted as referring to Sue and
John. When Sue responds (Utterance 14), she first answers yes, and then (to be cooperative) restates this answer with
an unambiguous reference to this group, so the user knows how you was interpreted in her question. The user then
gives an explicit acknowledgement of this response (Utterance 15). (Note that the user is not obliged to do this; for
instance, when the user generates a new initiative at Utterance 10, an implicit acknowledgement of responses 8 and 9
is assumed.)
In Utterance 16, the user again uses the pronoun you, this time in an assertion. The addressee group is Sue, by
default. Again, you is ambiguous: it could refer just to Sue or to John and Sue. This time, both possible referents are
equally salient. In this situation, Sue responds with a referential clarification question (Utterance 17). Note that the
structural addressee of this question is the user, so Sue does not need to use an explicit addressee term. Sue’s question
initiates a subdialogue, and is pushed onto the stack. The user replies to the question in Utterance 18 with a ‘short
answer’ (a sentence fragment), and Sue’s question is removed from the stack; the dialogue act maximal on the stack
is now the user’s original assertion (modified by her clarification). Sue is the addressee of this assertion, and therefore
Sue responds with an acknowledgement in Utterance 19.
In Utterance 20, the user concedes the initiative. Each system-played character then generates a candidate initiative,
and they privately compare the scores of these candidates to decide who goes next. Bill has the highest-scoring
candidate, and therefore presents his initiative, which is a question (Utterance 21). The question is addressed to the
user. The default addressee group is Sue and the user; since the addressee is different, Bill uses an explicit addressee
term (the user’s name). The user replies with another short answer, and Bill gives an acknowledgement (Utterances
22 and 23).
In Utterance 24, the user reclaims the initiative, asking Bill and Mary a question. While her previous questions
were ‘checking’ questions, this is a ‘genuine’ question to which she does not know the answer: she is effectively
querying the private knowledge of Bill and Mary. Bill and Mary produce a group response in Utterances 25 and 26.
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2 Mary: Hello
3 Author: Add: Bill
4 Bill: Hello
5 Author: Add: Sue
6 Sue: Hello
7 Author: Mary, you are going to a restaurant tonight.
8 Mary: Okay.
9 Author: Bill, you are going to a pub tonight.
10 Bill: Okay.
11 Author: Ask where the user is going tonight.
12 Bill: Sure.
Fig. 10. Authoring dialogue for the conversation in Fig. 9.
Bill can only produce a partial answer, concerning where he individually is going, so he prefaces his response with
the particle Well. When it is Mary’s turn, she first generates an inter-respondent dialogue act (Really?), indicating
that Bill’s response is new to her; she then delivers a partial response of her own. It happens that these two partial
responses constitute a complete answer to the user’s question.
Out of interest, note that the system characters’ private knowledge bases and agenda of questions to ask are created
during an authoring dialogue which shares many of the characteristics of the dialogue just presented. The authoring
dialogue for the dialogue just presented is given in Fig. 10.
To begin with, the author brings three new characters into being with God-like utterances of creation. A character
responds to being created by saying hello. The author then tells the characters about themselves, getting acknowl-
edgements as appropriate (Utterances 7–10). Note that characters will ask clarification questions if they do not fully
understand what they are being told. Note also that for convenience, authoring dialogues assume a ‘whisper mode’,
where overhearers do not ground assertions which are not addressed to them. Finally, in Utterance 11, the author gives
one character an instruction to ask the user a certain question, again receiving an acknowledgement.
8. Evaluation of the system
There are many ways of evaluating the multi-speaker dialogue model presented above, and the system which im-
plements it. To evaluate the model directly, we could assess its coverage by analysing a corpus of multi-speaker
conversations. The proportion of exchanges in these conversations which cannot be explained using the model would
give an indication of the limitations of its coverage as a theory of human dialogue. To evaluate the model as imple-
mented in our system, we could give it to a group of naive users and assess the ‘coherence’ of the resulting dialogues.
The proportion of dialogues which are not coherent would give an indication of the accuracy of the model. To use
terminology from grammar evaluation, the latter evaluation would give an assessment of the precision of the dialogue
model, and the former would give an assessment of its recall.
There is also a more pragmatic way of evaluating the system, which is to assess its effectiveness in helping students
learn a foreign language. Recall from Section 1 that the purpose of our dialogue system is to provide an environment
for students to practise conversation in a foreign language being learned. Our motivation for building a multi-speaker
system is to allow students to practise constructions which require reference to different groups of agents, such as
personal pronouns and verb conjugation. A practical way of evaluating the system is to see how effective it is in
helping students learn such constructions. This method only indirectly evaluates the model of multi-speaker dialogue
implemented by the system. However, it also avoids the need to rely on analysts’ intuitions about dialogue strategies.
Our initial evaluation of the system has been a practical one. We developed a version of the system targeted at
learners of Ma¯ori, and designed to exercise the complex Ma¯ori pronoun system described in Section 6.1.1. For details
of this system see [40]. The system engages in a regular mixed-initiative dialogue with the student, but in addition
takes initiatives which create particular kinds of group referent, which can later be referred to with particular kinds of
pronoun. When an appropriate set of groups has been created, the system begins a series of checking questions, which
use the targeted pronouns and require answers including other pronouns. Fig. 11 shows illustrative extracts from a
teaching dialogue, translated to English. The system plays three characters: Wiremu, Ana and Eruera. The student
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2 Steve I’m going to the pub.
. . . . . .
3 Ana Eruera and I are going to the pub.
. . . . . .
4 Ana Where are we [incl,dual] going, Steve?
5 Steve We [inclusive, dual] are going to the pub.
6 Ana Well done!
. . . . . .
7 Eruera Where are Ana and I [excl,dual] going, Steve?
8 Steve To the pub.
9 Eruera You’re right—but can you use a full sentence? Where are Ana and I [excl,dual] going?
10 Steve You [dual] are going to the pub.
11 Eruera Nice one!
. . . . . .
12 Wiremu Where are you and Eruera and Ana going, Steve?
13 Steve We [incl,plur] are going to the pub.
14 Wiremu Your sentence is grammatically correct, but you’re not answering my question! Maybe
you mean “We [excl,plur] are going to the pub”. Let’s try again. Where are you and
Eruera and Ana going?
15 Steve We [excl,plur] are going to the pub.
16 Wiremu That’s right!
Fig. 11. Extract from a tutorial dialogue from the user trials (translated from Ma¯ori).
is called Steve. To begin with, a system character (Ana) asks Steve where he is going, and gets a reply. Later in the
dialogue (Utterance 3), the same character tells Steve that she and one other character (Eruera) are going to the pub
too. This creates several groups which can later be referred to, some of which include the student. In Utterances 4–5,
Ana asks the student a checking question using a first person dual inclusive pronoun, and gets a response involving
the same pronoun.6 In Utterance 7, Eruera asks the student a checking question involving a first person exclusive
dual pronoun. The student answers with a short answer (Utterance 8), which the system can understand, but since the
system’s focus is on eliciting pronouns, the student is prompted for a full sentence (Utterance 9). In Utterance 10,
the student provides a full sentence answer, using a second person dual pronoun. In Utterance 12, Wiremu asks the
student a question which requires an exclusive first-person plural pronoun. The student answers using an inclusive
pronoun instead (Utterance 13). The system indicates an error, and suggests a correction (Utterance 14), leading to a
correct response (Utterance 15).
During the checking phase, the system creates a list of all the pronouns which can be used to refer to the group
entities which have been created in the dialogue, and keeps a record of which pronouns have been correctly interpreted
and generated. Its initiatives are directed at the pronouns which the student has not yet fully assimilated. In the
checking phase, therefore, the dialogue is fully focused on the topic of personal pronouns. In our corpus of tutorial
dialogues, almost every student utterance uses a personal pronoun, and almost every system utterance includes a
personal pronoun.
A complete account of the evaluation is being written up as a separate paper; however, we can summarise it here.
Our users were students taking an introductory course in Ma¯ori at Otago University. One tutorial in this course focused
on the pronoun system. We divided the tutorial streams into three groups. In each group, students took two written
tests on the topic of personal pronouns: a pre-test and a post-test. In the ‘no-intervention’ group (n = 27), students
took the pre-test immediately followed by the post-test, and then had a normal tutorial. In the ‘normal-tutorial’ group
(n = 40), students took the pre-test, then had a normal tutorial, then took the post-test. In the ‘system’ group (n = 41),
students took the pre-test, then had a session with the dialogue system, then took the post-test. The tests each lasted 5
minutes, and the teaching interventions lasted 30 minutes.
We marked the tests out of 10; the scores are shown in Fig. 12. We conducted a two-way analysis of variance on
these scores. The two dimensions were test-type (pre-test and post-test) and group (no-intervention, normal-tutorial
6 Note that the dialogue involves other material too, so ‘the pub’ is not a correct answer to all questions which can be asked!
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and system). Across all groups, the pre-test mean was 3.155; the post-test mean was 5.081. There was a highly
significant main effect of test (p < 0.001). The interaction between test and group was also highly significant (p =
0.003).
It seemed likely that the interaction between test and group was mainly due to the difference between the no-
intervention group and the other two groups. To examine this hypothesis, we ran a second analysis of variance,
eliminating the no-intervention condition. In this analysis, there was still a strong main effect of test (p < 0.001), but
no longer any interaction between test and group (p = 0.678). In other words, regular tutorials and tutorials using
the system were equally effective in improving students’ ability to use Ma¯ori pronouns. This result provides a good
indication of the system’s utility as a teaching tool. It also provides some indirect evidence that the multi-speaker
dialogue environment provided by the system is one which students find natural.
9. Disagreements
As already mentioned, the implemented model of multi-speaker conversation described thus far makes two im-
portant simplifying assumptions: firstly that there will be no disagreements between participants (Assumption 3) and
secondly that there are no private conversations between participants (Assumption 4). In the remainder of the paper,
we will make some proposals about how to modify the model if these two assumptions are relaxed (as they frequently
are in actual multi-party interactions). The current section considers the case of disagreements; Section 10 considers
interruptions by overhearers, and Section 11 considers private communication.
9.1. Agreement and disagreement: a (slightly) richer model
Our treatment of agreement and disagreement as inter-respondent dialogue acts was very cursory; in this section
we outline a somewhat richer model. We are not aiming for a full treatment here, particularly of the phenomenon of
disagreement; this would require a detailed model of argumentation, which is not the focus of the current paper. Our
discussion is focused on agreement and disagreement as phenomena in multi-speaker dialogue. We consider two main
questions. Firstly, how should the conversation manager react to an utterance expressing disagreement? Secondly,
when is an individual character entitled to express disagreement?
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We will model an ‘agreement’ dialogue act as a special kind of acknowledgement, which carries an additional
assertion that the speaker already knew the fact being acknowledged (see Example 26) or would be able to infer it
herself given appropriate premises (see Example 27).
(26) Sue: The earth is flat.
Mary: Yes, it is.
(27) Sue: It’s late, so we should go home.
Mary: Yes, we should.
An acknowledgement by itself conveys the same acceptance of the fact or conclusion, but acceptance is due to a
recognition of the authority of the speaker uttering the material rather than to independent knowledge or reasoning.
In an agreement, acceptance is not due to authority; rather both speakers have equal authority about the matter being
agreed upon.
9.1.2. Conceding acknowledgements
Disagreements arise due to a hearer determining that an assertion from the speaker is inconsistent with her own
knowledge or reasoning. This situation does not always prompt a disagreement; if the hearer accepts the speaker’s au-
thority on the matter, she can simply respond with a special kind of acknowledgement which we can term a conceding
acknowledgement:
(28) Sue: The earth is flat.
Mary: Really? Okay.
In this example, Mary’s response signals to Sue that she is grounding Sue’s assertion by revising her own knowledge
base, or at least by adding a fact which is unexpected for her. (In our implemented system, the expression Really? just
indicates novelty of the grounded utterance, but in a context where disagreements are possible, and nonmonotonic
updates are supported, it is better to interpret it as indicating a revision of some kind.)
9.1.3. Disagreements
Agreement and conceding acknowledgement are both simple backward-looking dialogue acts. An explicit disagree-
ment, which occurs if the hearer does not accept the speaker’s authority, is more complex. It has a backward-looking
component, in that it comments on the preceding assertion, but also a forward-looking component, in that it itself
invites a response. In Ginzburg and Sag’s [16] terminology, an utterance which expresses disagreement about a pre-
viously asserted proposition P is understood as making the question ‘is P true?’ maximal on the stack. At this point,
we might imagine a debate ensuing as to whether or not P is the case.
A great deal has already been written about disagreement and argumentation in dialogue (see e.g. [3,16,24]).
However, most of this work has concerned two-speaker dialogues. When considering how to introduce disagreements
into a multi-speaker dialogue model, it makes sense to work incrementally. A central question to consider is how
disagreements affect turn-taking in multi-speaker dialogue. To focus on this question, we begin by considering a class
of dialogues where disagreements do not elicit debate.
Assumption 7. A dialogue participant who disagrees with another participant expresses disagreement, but does not
seek to convince this participant with arguments.
What modifications to the dialogue management model are required in order to cater for minimal disagreements of
this kind?
The simplest case of disagreement is illustrated in Dialogue 29.
(29) Sue: The earth is flat.
Mary: No it isn’t.
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One structure which must be changed to represent this simple exchange is the dialogue stack. Note that the disagree-
ment statement itself expresses an assertion, to which the original speaker must then respond. This response can be
another disagreement. Given that a disagreement has backward-looking and forward-looking components, one pos-
sibility would be to represent it as initiating its own subdialogue, with each disagreement adding another level of
nesting into the stack. However, this seems unnecessarily complicated. Essentially there are only two assertions being
made, so it seems sensible to restrict the level of nestedness in the stack to two. Accordingly, we propose that once a
disagreement relation has been established, the assertion it disagrees with on the stack should simply be removed, via
another ‘non-standard’ stack operation. On the other hand, we want to keep a record of the history of disagreements—
for instance, to prevent system characters from generating an infinite sequence of disagreements between one another.
Therefore we augment the new stack utterance with an agreement history, which states for each participant in the sub-
dialogue whether (s)he has already agreed or disagreed with this utterance. The proposed sequence of stack operations
for Dialogue 29 is shown in Fig. 13. This proposal can be justified by consideration of the role played by the stack in
our model. The stack is a representation of any recent forward-looking dialogue acts which have not yet been fully
responded to. Once a disagreement has been received, any subsequent dialogue act can be interpreted as a response
to the disagreement as an assertion in its own right; there is no need to keep the assertion being disagreed with on the
stack. In summary, the general principle we propose is as follows:
Principle 10. An explicit disagreement removes the assertion being disagreed with from the stack, and becomes
maximal on the stack itself as a statement of the negation of this assertion.
9.2. When disagreements should occur
Now that the effects of a disagreement have been defined, we must specify the conditions under which disagree-
ments will be expressed. This amounts to an assumption about the kind of people participating in our conversation.
Our assumption is that they are up-front about any disagreements they have.
Assumption 8. If a member of the responding group disagrees with an assertion, (s)he is obliged to signal disagree-
ment explicitly.
(In fact, we make a similar assumption about overhearers; see Section 10.) To prevent an infinite sequence of
disagreements, we must provide for a different way of expressing disagreement to an assertion which has already
been disagreed with; see Section 9.4 for some suggestions on this topic.
9.3. Disagreements in group responses
We can now consider the possibility of disagreements between speakers delivering a group response. In a group
response, each individual response functions as an assertion in its own right, with which subsequent respondents
can agree or disagree. We have just suggested that disagreements in some sense hijack the topic of a conversation,
eliminating the disagreed-with assertion from the stack. What happens if this assertion is addressed to more than one
respondent? The agenda-changing effect of a disagreement needs to be defined if it occurs in the context of a group
response.
We propose a pair of principles for modelling such situations: one for group responses to assertions and one for
group responses to questions. The former principle is as follows:
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Principle 11. A disagreement occurring during a group response to an assertion causes the abandoning of the original
assertion along with all responses generated so far, and becomes maximal on the stack as an independent assertion,
addressed to the other respondents plus the speaker being responded to, and with a suitable agreement history field.
According to this principle, the dialogue acts on the stack prior to the disagreement are no longer necessary as
attachment points to subsequent dialogue acts and can be deleted—all subsequent acts can be understood as responses
to the assertion made by the disagreeing speaker. A situation where this principle applies is given in Dialogue 30.
(30) Mary [to Tom and Dick]: The train is late.
Tom: Oh, right.
Dick: No it’s not.
The stack operations in this case are given in Fig. 14. Basically, after Dick’s disagreement, it is as though he has
just asserted The train is not late as his own initiative to the group comprising Mary and Tom. Mary and Tom both
therefore have a chance to respond. (Note that if Dick had responded first, the upshot would be just the same.)
The principle for group responses to questions is as follows:
Principle 12. A disagreement occurring during a group response to a question causes the abandoning of all the current
responses made so far, and attaches to the original question as the first response (with a suitable agreement history
field). All other respondents can then make subsequent responses, including any whose responses were abandoned.
The rationale here is that a disagreement does not remove the original question, only those answers to it given so
far. Thus subsequent responses remain answers to the original question. A situation where this principle applies is
given in Dialogue 31.
(31) Mary [to Tom and Dick]: Is the train late?
Tom: Yes.
Dick: No it’s not.
The stack operations in this case are given in Fig. 15. The upshot here is that Dick’s disagreement erases the answer
Tom gave previously, but Mary’s question remains. Tom is given another opportunity to provide an answer, this time
as a subsequent response to Dick. Naturally, he can choose to disagree in his turn.
9.4. Strategies for resolving disagreements
The question arises as to how disagreements can be resolved. One possibility is that the speaker whose assertion
was disagreed with can themselves make a conceding acknowledgement. For instance:
(32) Mary [to Tom and Dick]: Is the train late?
Tom: Yes.
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Dick: No it’s not.
Tom: Really? Okay.
Given that Tom must consider Dick an authority in order to make a conceding acknowledgement in this case, it is
perhaps somewhat presumptious for him to respond first; however, the pattern illustrated in Dialogue 32 is certainly
found in natural conversation. Similar conceding acknowledgements could be made by Mary or Tom in Dialogue 30,
indicating retraction of an earlier assertion.
Another possibility is that participants can ‘agree to disagree’, so as to be able to prevent an infinite sequence of
disagreements and move the conversation on to other topics. This is hard to signal by means of a stock phrase—
perhaps phrases like Hmm! or Whatever! come closest.
(33) Mary: The train is late.
Dick: No it’s not.
Mary: Hmm. Whatever!
In addition, if a new initiative occurs after an unresolved disagreement, it should probably be interpreted as an implicit
decision (by all parties) to agree to disagree.
To model agreeing to disagree, we suggest a very minimal update, namely that both participants retract the facts
which led to the disagreement, and ground two related facts about their beliefs. Thus both Sue and Mary end up
agreeing that Mary thinks the train is late and that Dick thinks it is not, while remaining uncommitted as to the fact
itself or its negation. This is consistent with the standard formulation of belief in epistemic logic, in which it is possible
to assert one’s belief in a proposition without asserting the proposition itself, but more to the point, it permits sensible
answers to questions about the disputed fact—provided we assume that a question about a fact can be answered
obliquely by a statement about beliefs about that fact. These belief statements provide an answer to a slightly different
question, and therefore need have a marked information structure (see e.g. [6]); but nonetheless, questions about the
disputed fact will now receive uncontentious belief statements as answers.
(34) Sue: Is the earth flat?
Mary: You think it is. I don’t think so.
Sue: That’s right.
Naturally, another way in which speakers resolve disagreements is by argumentation and debate. It remains to be
seen whether anything like Principles 10, 11 and 12 survive in a more complete model of argumentation in multi-
speaker dialogue.
10. Interruptions
10.1. Obligatory interruptions
We have now discussed how to handle disagreements between members of the addressee group of an incoming
assertion. But recall: Assumption 2 states that every participant in the conversation must actively interpret every
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may disagree with an assertion, even if its addressee accepts or agrees with it. An overhearer may also need to ask
clarification about the meaning of an utterance which is already clear to its addressee—this can certainly happen
if there is no requirement that all participants share the same representation of the common ground. In both these
situations, we suggest that an overhearer can generate an interrupting dialogue act. In fact, we will state a pair of
refinements on Assumption 2, as a proposal for the degree of involvement overhearers should have in a multi-speaker
dialogue system.
Policy 6. If an overhearer disagrees with an assertion to which none of the addressees disagree, (s)he is obliged to
interrupt to disagree.
Policy 7. If an overhearer needs to clarify an utterance which none of the addressees need to clarify, (s)he is obliged
to interrupt to ask a clarification question.
These policies ensure that overhearers never get out of touch with the ongoing conversation. But they also preserve
the special status of addressees: by preference, overhearers allow their disagreements or clarification questions to be
voiced by members of the addressee group, and only interrupt themselves if this does not happen.
Policies 6 and 7 could be implemented by modifying the loops over system characters described in Section 4.3.
Recall that there are two loops: in the first, each system character interprets each utterance made, and in the second,
each character is given the chance to respond. In the algorithm given in Section 4.3, characters who are not part of the
addressee group do not respond at all. The necessary modification is to require a non-addressee character to make a
response (i.e. to interrupt) to express a disagreement or ask a clarification question—but only if none of the addressee
group express a similar utterance. This strategy either requires two response loops (one for addressees and one for
overhearers) or some additional private communication between system characters.
10.2. The structure of interruptions
Interruptions can be incorporated into our dialogue model quite readily, by asserting that the effect of an interrup-
tion is to force the interrupting speaker into the addressee group of the utterance (s)he is responding to.
Principle 13. An interrupting response from a participant has the effect of adding this participant retrospectively into
the addressee group of the utterance being responded to.
This principle is parsimonious, as it allows a model of interruptions to be subsumed under the model of group
responses already given. The principle also seems quite natural. Interrupting by asking a clarification question, or
expressing disagreement is a natural means for an overhearer to integrate him/herself into an ongoing conversation, as
discussed further in Section 10.3.
One case where Principle 13 might be questioned is when an interruption follows an imperative, as in Dialogue 35.
(35) Bob: Sue, John, one of you feed the dog.
Mary: Which dog?
In this example, Bob’s command is not initially addressed to Mary, but Mary interrupts to ask a clarification question
about it. After Mary’s interruption, do we really want to say that Mary is added to the addressee group of Bob’s
command? Clearly, we do not want to suggest that the pronoun you in Bob’s command needs to be reinterpreted
so as to include Mary after her interruption. (Similarly for an implicit you in an imperative like Sue, John, feed the
dog.) So Mary’s interruption does not impose a direct obligation on her to feed the dog. However, we suggest that
by interrupting Mary takes on an obligation to see to it that either Sue or John feeds the dog. We believe that her
interruption naturally carries this obligation; it seems the most natural reason for her to need to clarify what Bob’s
order is. Since our system is not geared towards interpreting imperatives, our current model of dialogue acts is not rich
enough to model obligations of this sort—however, they can certainly be modelled in more elaborate schemes such as
that of Traum [35].
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phrases (for example excuse me, hold on).
10.3. Optional interruptions
Not all interruptions serve the end of maintaining consistency between participants in a conversation. Interruptions
can also be made for more positive reasons, when an overhearer can contribute additional material to the responses
given by its addressees. The most obvious example is in question-answering. In a dialogue system, a simple policy is
that participants are obliged to help answer a question, even if it is not addressed to them.
Policy 8. If an overhearer can contribute material to an answer beyond the material contributed by its addressees, (s)he
is obliged to do so.
Again, we must assume separate response loops over addressees and overhearers in order to implement this.
Interruptions can also subserve a purely interpersonal goal—the goal of ‘becoming more involved in the conver-
sation’. Even if overhearers cannot contribute anything new to a group response, they can give acknowledgements
(Okay) or conceding acknowledgements (Really?), or express agreement (That’s right). Such interruptions are com-
mon in natural conversations, and must be provided for in a general model of conversation:
Principle 14. An overhearer is entitled to join the addressee group by signalling acknowledgement, conceding ac-
knowledgement or agreement.
In our system, however, we would probably prohibit such interruptions as a matter of policy, because they do not
further any system goals.
10.4. Other varieties of interruption
Note that there are several kinds of interruption which we are not concerned to model in the present account. Many
of the phenomena classified as interruptions in the literature are due to the real-time parallel nature of human conversa-
tion. For instance, one type of interruption functions to make a claim to the floor, either by preventing another claimant
from obtaining it [30], or by anticipating an imminent transition relevance point and posting a claim on it in advance
[13]. Such interruptions typically result in overlapping speech, and sometimes even in fully out-of-sequence dialogue
acts. In our text-based dialogue medium, with no time pressure on user initiatives, and a deterministic algorithm for
choosing system initiatives, there are no floor-claiming interruptions of this kind. Another kind of interruption is an
attempt to initiate a separate dialogue, either to run in parallel with the one currently under way (see [36]) or to replace
it, in which a forward-looking act on the stack is simply ignored. Again, we have not considered such cases; the above
model assumes that there is just one conversation going on, even if not all participants are actively involved at all
times.
11. Extensions to the notion of common ground for multi-speaker dialogue
In a two-speaker dialogue, where the system is playing one participant, the common ground simply holds the set
of all propositions which have been grounded by one or other participant. However, where there are more than two
participants, the situation is more difficult. The main problem is the possibility of private communication between
subsets of the participants. For instance, if a speaker A asserts a fact F to an addressee B, and another participant C
arrives after this has taken place, we cannot use a single common ground to represent the knowledge states of the
participants.
Our basic proposal is to break each participant’s common ground representation into components, and to allow
different components of the structure denoting different interactions to be labelled with the subset of participants
who were privy to them. The different components can be related together using an established concept in DRT—the
concept of accessibility.
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11.1. Accessibility in DRT
In DRT, the common ground does not consist of a single DRS, but of a hierarchical structure of nested DRSs. One
of these DRSs is the ‘working DRS’; this is the DRS into which the propositions from the nucleus of the current
utterance will be copied. When resolving the presuppositions of the current utterance, only the predicates in the
working DRS, and certain other structurally related DRSs (including those DRSs in which it is nested) are accessible.
The original rationale for this notion of accessibility is to provide an account of why certain quantifying constructions
create referents which are inadmissible as antecedents for subsequent pronouns. For instance, the pronoun it cannot
refer back to the car in Example 36:
(36) The teacher does not own a car? It is shiny.
The common ground after interpretation of the first sentence in this example is as shown in Fig. 16. The outer DRS
is the working DRS, so predicates in the sub-DRS are not accessible for resolving the presuppositions of the it in the
second sentence This explains the infelicity of this sentence.
11.2. An extended notion of accessibility for multi-speaker conversation
The simplest type of multi-speaker dialogue is one where there are no disagreements and no private communi-
cations. To model this situation, we still need one representation of the common ground for each of the participants
played by the system, because we do not want to allow any privileged forms of communication between such par-
ticipants. We can term these common grounds CGP1 . . .CGPn, where CGP i represents participant P i’s belief about
what is collectively believed by all N + 1 participants.
Now consider what happens in a dialogue between three participants A, B and C, if at some point a private
conversation happens between A and C. (The private utterances are given in italics.)
(37) A: There’s a red dog outside.
B/C: Okay. [B leaves].
A [to C]: There’s a black dog upstairs.
C [to A]: Okay. [B returns].
B [to A&C]: The dog is barking.
Consider B’s final assertion. Here, B returns to the conversation using a referring expression (the dog) which would
have been unambiguous at the point she left it. It is clearly inappropriate for A and C to resolve the presupposed dog
against the black dog introduced privately between them; in other words, A and C need to interpret B’s utterance
using the common ground as it was when B left. To model this notion, we suggest representing the common ground
as a list of DRSs, each annotated with a subset of dialogue participants as well as the usual ‘referents’ and ‘conditions’
fields. Each time the set of participants present changes, we create another DRS in this list, annotated with the new
participants. In any given dialogue context, only a subset of these DRSs will be accessible when resolving presup-
positions. We can now propose general principles about accessibility and about the construction of common ground
DRSs.
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Principle 15. When resolving the presuppositions of an utterance made in the presence of a set S of participants, any
DRS whose participant set does not include every member of S is taken to be inaccessible.
Note that the set S referred to in Principle 15 is the set of all dialogue participants, including overhearers. An
alternative principle would include just the speaker and addressee group; however, we feel that if overhearers are
genuine participants in the dialogue, the principle needs to be extended to cover them too.
Principle 16. If the set of participants for the current utterance is different from that for the previous utterance, a new
DRS should be created whose participant set is the current set. Grounding should add material to the most-recently-
created DRS.
To illustrate, Fig. 17 shows the new format for the common ground (as represented by either A or C) after the last
utterance in Example 37 has been grounded. The rightmost DRS is the most recently created; it was created when B
returned to the conversation, changing the set of participants. The middle DRS is associated with A and C’s private
dialogue. The leftmost DRS is associated with the dialogue involving all three participants. The top field in each DRS
holds the participant set. The second field holds DRS referents, as normal (note that this includes the participants in
the conversation, as they can be referred to). The arrows indicate accessibility relationships between DRSs. From the
rightmost DRS, only the leftmost DRS is accessible. Thus B’s referring expression the dog can only refer back to the
red dog. For similar reasons, if A used the referring expression the dog after B has returned, it would unambiguously
refer to the red dog, even for C.
If A wants to refer to the privately-introduced black dog after B has returned, what should she do? From the
point of view of B , an indefinite DP would seem most appropriate. But it is also necessary to signal to C that the
newly-introduced dog is the one which was privately introduced earlier. To solve the problem, we suggest the use of
a special predicate talking_about. Whenever a new referent X is introduced into a sub-DRS with participant set S,
a condition is added of the form talking_about(S,X). talking_about predicates are stipulated to be accessible from
any sub-DRS. Now if A wants to refer to the black dog, she can use a DP like a dog that I and C were talking about
(or perhaps the dog that I and C were talking about, which B should be able to accommodate without difficulty).
Note that B might not learn all the privately-introduced facts about this dog from such referring expressions. But the
talking_about predicate at least provides a link to the private referent which is shared by all three speakers.
12. Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we have described a number of extensions to a conventional two-person dialogue system to allow it
to support multi-speaker conversations. The core extensions have already been implemented: an overall conversation
manager looping over system-played characters, a definition of a group response, algorithms for addressee selection
in utterance interpretation and generation, and an account of the semantics of addressee terms and personal pronouns.
Additional extensions, covering disagreements, interruptions and private communication, are presented as concrete
proposals. The main conclusion we draw from the work presented here is that extending a dialogue model to cater for
multiple speakers involves attention to a wide range of topics: classification of dialogue acts, dialogue management
algorithms, the representation and processing of referring expressions and addressee terms, and the structure of the
common ground.
The model of multi-speaker conversation which we have implemented makes certain practical simplifying assump-
tions, but nonetheless covers a good range of phenomena in natural multi-party conversations. The resulting dialogue
A. Knott, P. Vlugter / Artificial Intelligence 172 (2008) 69–102 101system allows rich multi-speaker interactions, which have been shown to be effective in helping students to learn the
complex Ma¯ori personal pronoun system. We believe the system will be able to support a number of other language-
learning activities, and intend to explore this idea in future work.
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